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MOTION BRAKING AND THE PERCEPTION OF CAUSALITY*
SUMMARY
The aim of this research was to find out whether it would be 
possible to produce specific, genuine, causal impressions of motion 
braking, in the visual field, which could compare with causal im ­
pressions of pushing, launching, tracing a.s.o. as described by Mi- 
chotte, in his work «La perception de la causalité».
For this, we tried to determine the simplest conditions of stimu­
lation which induced obseivers to mention in their responses a causal 
influence of braking.
The experiments consisted mainly in suddenly slowing down the 
movement of an object moving along a slit. This was taking place 
either without any accessory background structure, or at the moment 
the object was reaching a different coloured part of the background, 
or again when it had reached another, stationary, object over which 
it passed.
It was in this latter case that causal responses were most frequent, 
whilst they were sporadic in the former. The passing of the object 
over a different part of the background proved to be completely 
ineffective, under various time conditions, since the results were of 
the same order when the colour of the background was uniform. On 
the contrary, passing over another object was more efficient, espe­
cially when the duration of the slowmovement was limited to the 
superposition period of the two objects.
Changes in the stimulation system thus exerted a considerable in­
fluence on the frequency of the causal responses, but on the other 
hand had none on their content.
The analyses of their content clearly showed that the braking in-
♦ C ette  c o n tr ib u tio n  est p u b l ié e  ici p o u r  la p r e m iè r e  fois.
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fluence was not perceived, but inferred from the perceptual data, 
permitting «understanding» on the basis of acquired knowledge.
The main interest of our research seems therefore to be that it 
established the possibility of using an objective criterion justifying 
the distinction between responses corresponding to specific impres­
sions of causation and responses corresponding to inferences. In the 
first case alterations of the stimulus system brings about parallel 
changes in the content of the responses, whereas in the latter the 
responses remain practically unchanged; only their frequency varies.
RÉSUM É
Le but de ces recherches était de tâcher de provoquer chez des ob­
servateurs des impressions visuelles de freinage d’un mouvement, 
présentant un caractère originel et spécifique comme celles du lan­
cement, etc., décrites par Michotte.
A cet effet on a tenté de déterminer les conditions de stimulation 
les plus simples qui amenaient les sujets à mentionner dans leurs ré­
ponses une influence causale de freinage au cours des expériences 
auxquelles ils étaient soumis.
Ces expériences consistaient essentiellement à ralentir brusque­
ment le mouvement d’un mobile qui se déplaçait le long d’une fente. 
Ceci se produisait soit en l’absence de tout accessoire, soit au mo­
ment où le mobile atteignait un niveau à partir duquel le fond de­
vant lequel il se mouvait présentait une autre couleur, soit au mo­
ment où il atteignait un objet immobile devant lequel il passait.
C’est dans ce dernier cas que les réponses causales ont été les 
plus nombreuses alors que, dans les premiers, elles étaient sporadi- 
ques. La coïncidence du ralentissement avec le passage devant une 
autre zone du fond s’est montrée tout à fait inopérante dans diver­
ses conditions temporelles, les résultats étant du même ordre que 
pour un fond uniforme. Par contre le passage devant un autre ob­
jet était beaucoup plus favorable, et cela principalement lorsque le 
ralentissement se limitait à la durée de superposition des objets.
Les modifications du système de stimulation ont donc exercé une 
influence très nette sur la fréquence des réponses à signification 
causale.
D ’autre part, elles semblent n ’en avoir eu aucune sur leur con­
tenu. Celui-ci manifestait de façon constante que l’action de frei­
nage n ’était pas perçue, mais seulement inférée à partir des données
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perceptives dont il fournissait une explication empruntée à l’expé­
rience acquise.
L’intérêt majeur de nos recherches réside, semble-t-il, en ce qu’elles 
indiquent expérimentalement la possibilité d’utiliser un critère objec­
tif pour distinguer les cas dans lesquels il y a une impression cau­
sale spécifique, de ceux dans lesquels l'influence causale est inférée.
Dans la première éventualité, les modifications que l’on fait subir 
au système des excitants entraîne des altérations parallèles et systé­
matiques dans le contenu des réponses des sujets.
Dans le second cas au contraire, le contenu des réponses demeure 
semblable et ce n’est que leur fréquence qui varie.
In his exp erim en ts  on «The perception  of causality» (1, 2, 3) 
Michotte w a s  able to dem onstrate  the existence  of m a n y  kinds 
of p ercep tu al ly  g ive n  causal  im pressions, like pushing, kicking, 
throw ing,  tracing, erasing, etc. A c c o r d in g  to M ichotte these im ­
pressions are p r im a ry  ones, i.e. they should  be con ceived  of as 
specif ic  perceptual responses directly  elicited by a definite  s y s ­
tem of stimuli.
T h e o re t ic a l ly  M ichotte reduces them to one basic  perceptual 
sch em e called «ampliation», essen tia l ly  a p a rt ic u la r  k inetic  
structure corresp on din g  to a st im ulus  system  w h i c h  includes 
tw o st im ulus  objects m o v in g  in the sam e direction.
It fo l lo w s  that it w o u ld  be im possible  to in d u ce  causal  i m ­
pressions by st im ulus  condit ions w h ic h  d o n ’ t fit in w i t h  this 
basic  schem e. E xam p les  of these n eg a t ive  cases are «braking» 
(causally  determ ined  s lo w in g  d o w n  of m o vem en t)  (1, p. 217) or 
«attraction» ( l ,p .216). Indeed in som e exp erim en ts  w h e r e  b ra k in g  
or attraction w e r e  displayed, it w a s  found that subjects  did not 
report causal im pressions (1. pp. 99 , 154). For e x a m p le  one could  
expect  b ra k in g  responses in som e of his p u sh in g  experim ents:  
A n  object  A  m o v e s  in the direction of a s tat ion ary  object  B. A fter  
reach in g  it, both m o v e  w ith  equal speed, i.e. ju x ta p o se d  in the 
sam e direction of A ’s orig inal  m o v e m e n t.  W h e n  the v e lo c ity  of 
A  and B after their ju n ction  is m u ch  less than A ’s or ig in al  v e ­
locity  (1, p. 156), one could  h a v e  the im pression that A ’s speed is 
braked by B. In this case h o w e v e r ,  n o b o d y  observed that the 
en cou n ter  w ith  obstacle  B caused the s lo w in g  d o w n  of A.
B asing  on ese lf  on M ich o tte ’s a m p lia t io n  theory  one could not
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expect  b rak in g  a n sw ers  in this case. W h e n  B ’s m o v e m e n t  has to 
be the cause  of A ’s s lo w in g  d ow n , object  B has to be the «centre 
de référence» of A ’s m o v e m e n t  after their m eeting, for it is the 
essence of a m p lia t io n  that the d o m in an t  m o v e m e n t  (the m o v e ­
m ent of the «centre de référence»») exp an d s  over  the patient (the 
other object). In that case o n ly  does one h a v e  a causal im p res­
sion. It is h o w e v e r  c lear  that A ’s m o vem en t,  and not B ’s, w i l l  
exert  the d o m in a n c e  once the ju n ct io n  com pleted,  a d o m in a n ce  
it necessarily  obtains during  the period A  m oves  alone. This  is 
also the case in all other im a g in a b le  b ra k in g  situations (1, p. 
99); the object  that causes the b r a k in g  cannot be e n d o w e d  w ith  
the d o m in a n t  m o vem en t,  therefore there is no am p lia t io n  and 
one cannot  h a v e  a causal  im pression in the sense of M i c h o t t e .
O n e  m a y  w o n d e r  h o w e v e r ,  if M ich o tte ’s theory  does not 
co n fl ic t  w ith  the current opinion that w e  can very  w e l l  p erce ive  
v is u a l ly  that a car is being braked or that som e iron object  is 
be ing  attracted b y  a m agnet.  T h e  question arises then, w h e th e r  
conditions d if ferent  from those stipulated by Michotte might 
not also produce  causal  impressions. T h e  o n ly  study a long  these 
lines w h ic h  is k n o w n  to us is that by K a n izsa  and Metelli  (4) w h o  
c la im  to h a v e  found a v isu al  effect  of attraction that w o u ld  be 
im m e d ia te ly  g iven  as such. H o w e v e r ,  s ince the authors neither 
m ention  a n y  q uan titat ive  results, nor even  m a k e  it c lear  w h e t ­
her or not their subjects k n e w  b e fo re h a n d  w h a t  they w e re  sup­
posed to see, this e x p e r im e n t  cannot be considered as c o n c lu ­
sive.
O u r  exp erim en ts  are d ea l in g  w ith  the b rak in g  effect  only.
Let us suppose that subjects are sh o w n  a rotating disc w h ic h  
is brought to a standstill  b y  the action of a b rak eb lo ck ;  w h e n  
asked w h a t  they h a v e  seen, most subjects w o u ld  p ro b ab ly  an s­
w e r  that they  s a w  a «braking» of som e kind H o w e v e r ,  our 
problem  is: does this refer to a specif ic  perceptual structure 
of «checking the m ovem en t» ,  or should  one say  that these su b ­
jects s a w  so m eth in g  (the approach  of the b lock  and the s lo w in g  
d o w n  of the w h eel)  w h i c h  they then interpret as b r a k in g  ? Such 
an interpretation could be based on p re v io u s ly  acquired k n o w ­
ledge. M o reo ver  one should not forget that the w o rd  «braking» 
can be used in a w id e  v a r ie ty  of situations: the skater com es
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to a stop by a ltering the position of his skates, a cart gets stuck 
in the sand, a d r iver  puls on the brakes  (in w h ic h  latter case 
one cannot even see h o w  the brake w orks),  etc.
In our exp erim en ts  w e  h a ve  m ad e an attem pt to reproduce 
the essential co m p o n en t  of b ra k in g  situations l ike  those just 
m entioned,  using a v e ry  s im ple  and sch em atic  st im ulus  system. 
W e  expected that the role of previous  ex p e r ien ce  m ig h t  thus 
be e l im in ated  as m u ch  as possible. A lso  it m igh t  then be p os­
sible  to d isco ver  by sy s te m a tic a l ly  c h a n g in g  the stim ulus  c o n ­
ditions, w h ic h  perceptual structures w o u ld  in duce  our subjects 
to m en tion  causal  im pressions in their protocols.
We made use of Michotte’s rotating disc device (1, p. 25-32). This 
consists of a circular cardboard disc, with a diameter of 50 cm. On these 
discs are drawn arcs of circles having the same center as the disc, 
as well as Archimedian spirals. The disc could be rotated behind 
an opaque screen with a horizontally radial slit of 5 mm width and 
a variable length. Under these conditions an observer will perceive 
arcs on the rotating disc as unmoving rectangles in the slit, whereas 
spirals will be seen as moving rectangles. In this ways a number of 
moving and stationary figures can be produced in the slit. The velo­
city of the moving figures depends on the characteristics of the 
spirals as well as on the rotation speed of the disc. A more complete 
description of this technique can be found in 1 loc.cit., 5, p. 186 
and 6 (p. 183-185).
O u r  first e xp e rim en ts  w e r e  to find out w h e t h e r  subjects  w o u ld  
g ive  causal  responses w h e n  presented w ith  the s im plest  possible 
st im ulus  pattern.
Experiment I.
The background behind the slit is in two parts: white at the left 
(75 mm) and black at the right (25 mm). Left of the separation line 
a red rectangle (5X10 mm) is visible, its right side being at a distance 
of 60 mm from the separation of black and white. Eventually this rec­
tangle starts moving to the right (313.3 cm/sec.). At the precise time 
the left side of this rectangle coincides with the separation line, the 
velocity changes to 4.7 cm/sec. The object then moves at this con­
stant speed over the black part of the background until it disappears 
behind the screen on the right.
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The stimulus was presented to 50 «fresh» subjects, i.e. subjects 
who had no knowledge of the purpose of the experiment and who 
were merely requested to describe what they saw (the instruction was 
given this way in all experiments, which were always made on fresh 
observers).
Basing ourselves on Michotte’s theory, we could not expect reports 
of primary causal impressions in this experiment.
O n ly  seven  subjects  (1 4 % )  used causal expressions. A re­
sponse is called  a causal one w h e n  the subject does not only 
m en tio n  the s lo w in g  d o w n  of the m ovem en t,  but also exp la in s  
it by  reference to so m e th in g  linked w ith  the b lack  that opposes 
resistance to the red object. For instance: «It looks like the red 
b e in g  held up by so m e th in g  on the separation  b etw een  w h ite  and 
black». Four subjects m entioned  a friction b etw een  red and 
b la c k  as cause, and two subjects a greater  density of the sur­
roundings on the black.
In this e x p e r im e n t  two ch an ges  occur s im u lta n e o u sly :  a) a 
sudden s la c k e n in g  of the m o vem en t,  b) the object arrives in 
front of a d ifferent  background. It w o u ld  perhaps be possible 
to heighten  the freq u en cy  of causal  reports by a ltering the time 
relations b e tw e e n  the tw o  events.
Experiment II.
Three different discs were used:
1 . As in Exp. I the background of a white part at the left and a 
black part at the right. The red object’s (5X10 mm) right side is 
initially 85 mm to the left of the separation line. Then it moves 
to the right at a speed of about 20 cm/sec. When it is 25 mm at the 
left of the separation line, its speed changes to about 3 cm/sec. and 
at this speed the object moves on until it disappears on the right of 
the slit.
2. Like 1., except that the object is initially 45 mm on the left of 
the boundary line and only changes speed when it is clearly upon 
the black background; i.e. when its left side is 5 mm over the boun­
dary line.
3. Like 2., with the difference that the object changes speed still 
later, i.e. when its left side is 35 mm on the right of the separation 
line.
A ll  subjects  w e r e  sh o w n  the three patterns su ccessive ly  in all
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presentation orders. U sing  four subjects  in e v e ry  order, 24 su- 
jects in all w e r e  involved.
T h e  results w e r e  v e r y  s im ila r  to those of Exp. I. O n ly  three 
subjects (1 2 % )  m entioned  b ra k in g  im pressions. O n e  of them 
w ith  all three displays, and tw o others w ith  d isp lay  N" 2 . W e  
w e r e  not able  to establish a n y  in f lu en ce  of the d ifferent time 
conditions. It w o u ld  thus seem  as though the relationship  b e ­
tw ee n  the s la ck e n in g  of the m otion and the passing of  the 
object  in front of a d ifferent  b ack gro u n d  w ere ,  for the p racti­
cal purposes, irre le va n t  to our problem .
So far, som e interesting conclusions  m a y  a lre a d y  be d ra w n :
1. T h e  im m e n s e  m a jo r ity  of observers  described the s lo w in g  
d o w n  of the m o v e m e n t  and its location  and considered the 
s la c k e n in g  as spontaneous;  o n ly  v e ry  fe w  subjects  did m e n ­
tion a causal re lationship  (in acco rd a n ce  w ith  M ich o tte ’s 
theory).
2. In the fe w  cases of causal  reports, the supposed cause  w a s  
a lw a y s  so m eth in g  w h ic h  w as not g iv en  in the display, e.g. 
a sort of resistance or v iscosity  w h e r e  the b a ck g ro u n d  w a s  
black.
It seem s thus as though the b a ck g ro u n d  p layed  p ract ica l ly  
no role at all, the m ain  thing b ein g  the  ch a n g e  of  s p e e d  itself,  
w h ic h  in s o m e  cases in d u c e  observers  to th in k  of, or to infer, a 
p o ss ib le  cause  and to fo r m u la te  di f f erent  h y p o th e se s  co n c e r n in g  
their  nature.  In these conditions therefore, no specific,  g e n u in e  
cau sa l  im pressions are reported. It m ig h t  seem  at first g lan ce  
that such a result should  h a v e  been expected, o w in g  to the s c h e ­
m atic  and artif ic ial  ch a racter  of the display. But, and this is an 
essential  point that should  be borne in m ind all the w a y  through 
w h e n  discussing investigations  of this kind, in the case of e x ­
perim ents  on «pushing» etc., the d isp lay  is e q u a l ly  sch em atic  
and artificial  and besides, the observers  m a y  k n o w , and in fact 
do g e n e ra l ly  k n o w  that the d isp lay  consists o n ly  of spots of 
co lo u r  painted on paper and that there is no «real» p u sh in g  at 
all. N evertheless ,  this does not p reven t  them  from reporting that 
they actu ally  see  on e  o b je c t  p u s h in g  the other.
T h e  n eg a t ive  results obtained  up to this point induced us to 
try d ifferent ch an ges  in the d isplay  in order to produce  another
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kind of structure of the perceptual  field w h ic h  could possibly 
alter the nature  of the responses. Since the b ackgrou n d  had 
proved to be ineffective,  w e  tried to bring  in a s e c o n d  o b ject  
in front of  w h ic h  the first w o u ld  m o v e  after reach in g  it, its 
m otion b e in g  s lack en ed  at that m om ent.
Experiment III.
The background is 170 mm in length. At the left, 5 mm from the 
edge is a red rectangle (5 X 10 mm), and at a distance of 60 mm from 
its right side is the left of a black rectangle (5 X 25 mm). The white 
background extends then 70 mm further to the right. (As a conse­
quence of the enclosure principle the black rectangle is seen in this 
case as a «figure» and constitutes thus the second object). Eventually 
the red object starts moving to the right (31.3 cm/sec.). The moment 
the red object’s left side coincides with the black’s left, the velocity 
changes to 4.7 cm/sec. and the object moves on at this constant 
speed until it disappears behind the screen on the right.
This experiment differs from Exp. I by the white part added to 
the right of the black.
A m o n g  50 fresh subjects, 17 (3 4 % )  reported h a v in g  seen the 
red object  b ein g  b ra ked  w h e n  it m o v e d  ov er  the b la ck  part. 
This  n u m b e r  is s ig n if ic a n t ly  h igh er  than the n u m b e r  found in 
Exp. I (chi-square: p < .  05). Thus there is an im portant increase in 
the fre q u e n cy  of the causal  responses, but their nature rem ains 
the sam e as in the p rev io u s  experim ents.  A n  inspection of the 
in d iv id u a l  protocols m akes  this c lear  enough. First, 13 subjects 
w h o  reported a b rak in g  impression m ad e  use of expressions 
like: «It appears as if...it g ives  the impression that...one could 
b e l ie v e  that...» etc. So, it is o b vio u s  again  that the stim ulus  sys­
tem did o n ly  suggest  the idea of «checking» the motion. F u r­
thermore, 4 of our subjects  did refer to e x a m p le s  taken from 
e v e r y d a y  experience.  T h e y  thought of the b lack  as of a tunnel 
through w h ic h  the red object could only  proceed w ith  d iff icu lty;  
or the red object w a s  im agin ed  as a cart c o m in g  from a h ig h w a y  
on to a track, or as a ro ll ing  ball  la n d in g  in the sand. O n e  of 
them  said: «The red falls  into the butter»; 9 subjects did not 
refer  to such specific  points and o n ly  said that the red object 
appeared to be grating the b la ck  or got stuck to it, or called  the 
b la c k  m agnetic ,  all physical  factors not present in the display.
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This rise in n u m b er  of causal  reports st im ulated  us to stress 
still m ore the connection  b e tw e e n  the s lo w in g  d o w n  and the 
passing in front of the black. In the next e x p e r im e n t  there is 
not only  a s lo w in g  d o w n  of the m o v e m e n t  of the red object 
w h e n  it arrives  at the black, but this s lackened  m o v e m e n t  is 
also restricted to the period the red passes over  the black,  so 
that the m o v e m e n t  resum es its or ig in al  speed once it is on the 
right w h ite  part of the background.
Experiment IV.
The difference with Exp. Ill is that the velocity of the red rec­
tangle changes to 31.3 cm/sec. the moment its left side is on the 
black’s right. So the movement proceeds in three phases: fast-slow- 
fast.
O u t of 50 subjects  29 reported the red to be braked (5 8 % ) .  
This  n u m b e r  is s ig n if ic a n t ly  h ig h e r  than that found in Exp. Ill  
(chi-square: p < .  05) and also o b v io u s ly  better than that in Exp. 
I (chi-square: p<C. 001). O u r  b rake  response criterion w a s  the 
sam e as described in connection  w ith  Exp. I.
Here too, m a n y  (16) subjects w h o  reported a braking, d escr i­
bed the s ituation in terms of «as if», and 21 subjects  referred to 
the in f lu e n ce  of u n p erce ived  properties or factors (m agnetic  fo r ­
ces, grating, etc.).
It is n o te w o r th y  that in spite of the large increase  in the 
n u m b e r  of cau sal  responses, o n ly  4 subjects w e r e  disturbed by  
the sudden acce lerat io n  of the red, after it had passed the black. 
T h e y  groped for all k inds  of p ecu lia r  ex p la n a t io n s  for this 
accelaration,  l ike «The b lack  pushes the red aw ay» ,  «The b la ck  
fires the red», «The red arrives  upon a conveyor».  T h e  other o b ­
servers satisfied th em selves  b y  s im p ly  say in g  that the red w a s  
being  braked and a fterw a rd s  just  w e n t  on as before. S trangely  
enough, the subjects  did not e x p l ic it ly  refer to a s e l f -m o v in g  
object, the m otion  of  w h ic h  w o u ld  s im p ly  be tem p o rar i ly  re­
strained by  passing in front of an o th er  object.
The fo l lo w in g  e x p e r im e n t  is designed to establish further the 
necessity  of a second object  of som e kind to be present in order 
to produce  b ra k in g  reports.
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Experiment V.
The difference with Exp. IV is that the background is entirely 
white, so that the movement of the red object (fast-slow-fast) pro­
ceeds in front of a white background.
This  d isplay  w a s  presented to 15 subjects. O n ly  three of them 
(2 0 % ) said they s a w  the object  being  b raked  by so m eth in g  they 
could not see, but supposed to be w orkin g .  This  result differs 
s ign if ican tly  from that of Exp. IV  (Fisher exact  p rob ab il ity  test: 
p<C. 01). C u r io u s ly  enough, this tem porary  deceleration did not 
m a k e  our subjects  think of a b rak in g  factor. If one com p ares  the 
results w ith  those of Exp. I and II, one notices that they are 
n e a r ly  equal  (Fisher test: no s ign if ican t  differences),  w h ic h  
proves once m ore  that the structure of the b ackgrou n d  is not 
an im portant factor in prod u cin g  braking  reports.
It is c lear  that all these exp erim en ts  point to the sam e general 
conclusions.  W e  h a v e  a ltogether  59 (on a total of  189) records 
of cau sal  responses g iv e n  in d e p en d en tly  by fresh observers  w h o  
had n e v e r  taken part in s im ila r  exp erim ents;  and in all these 
cases the «causes» w e r e  a lw a y s  extrinsic  to the perceptual  struc­
ture (this refers of course only  to our o w n  research '). N o n e  of 
the subjects ev er  reported seeing one object checking the 
motion of another, w h e re a s  in M iciio tte ’s exp erim en ts  on c a u s a ­
tion, observers  constantly  said that they s a w  the moving object 
pushing the other ahead.
N everth e less  the s la ck e n in g  has been related to the second 
object, but this happ en ed  by m ean s  of a «hidden» property  of 
this object, l ike v iscosity  and so on. T hese  references to n u m e r ­
ous u n p e rce ive d  factors sh o w  at once that in this case w e  are 
not d e a l in g  w ith  a specif ic  im pression of «braking», but that the
1 O n e  m a y  w o n d e r  w h a t  the results w o u ld  h a v e  b een  if still  o th er  d isp la y s  
had b een  used, for  in sta n ce  d isp la y s  u sin g  the m o re  «natural»» g r a d u a l  d e c e ­
leration . T r ia ls  to p e r fo r m  su ch  an e x p e r im e n t  s h o w e d  that p e o p le  e x p e ­
rien ced  c o n s id e r a b le  d if f ic u lt ie s  in p e r c e iv in g  a n y  d if fe re n c e  b e tw e e n  a s u d ­
d en  d e c e le ra t io n  of the treb le  as w e l l  as a g ra d u a l  d e c e le ra t io n  o f  the sam e 
order. A  still la rg e r  g r a d u a l  d e c re a se  in speed is not e a s i ly  p ra c t ic a b le  w ith  
the ro tatin g  discs d evice .  Besides, a la rg e  n u m b e r  o f  su b je cts  h a v in g  a c tu a l ly  
d e scr ib e d  the su d d e n  c h a n g e  in speed  as g r a d u a l ,  w e  did not co n s id e r  the 
g r a d u a l i ty  o f  speed c h a n g e  as an im p o rta n t  v a r ia b le .
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perceptual  data of the s la ck e n in g  of the first object  during its 
passage over  an o th er  object induce a n u m b e r  of observers  to 
think of e x p la n a to ry  hypotheses  of this fact, on the basis of 
k n o w le d g e  acquired  in the past. W e  h a v e  learned  that a m o ­
v in g  body does not ch an g e  its v e lo c ity  w ith o u t  the intervention  
of som e cause and w h e n  w e  p erce ive  a ch a n g e  of that kind, w e  
are l iable  to look for such a cause, w h ic h  in the case of  our 
exp erim en ts  could o n ly  be guessed.
F u rth erm ore  these exp erim en ts  h a v e  c lear ly  s h o w n  that even  
the a w a k e n in g  of the idea of the cause  w a s  dependent on the 
structure of the d isplay  —  the cases, scan ty  in ex p er im e n ts  I, II 
and V, b e ca m e  v e ry  n u m e ro u s  in III and IV, in w h ic h  the sys­
tem of st im uli  w a s  such that a strong co n n ect io n  w a s  estab lis­
hed b etw een  the s la ck e n in g  and the passage in front of the se­
cond object. N eedless  to say  the latter displays are m u c h  m ore  
s im ila r  to d a i ly  l ife  condit ions under w h ic h  a p h ys ica l  b rak in g  
takes place, and thus also better fitted to recall  the idea of such 
an event. This  is easy to understand, b ecau se  in m ost cases the 
s lo w in g  d o w n  of m o v e m e n t  is p rod u ced  by friction, w h e n  a bo­
dy is m o v in g  over  another. Furtherm ore,  it seem s that the most 
current concept of b ra k in g  is that of a tem p o rary  s lo w in g  d o w n  
prod u ced  by  co u n teract in g  for a w h i le  a co n tin u o u sly  w o r k in g  
force, l ike  gravity ,  a m e c h a n ic a l  motor, or v o lu n ta r y  h u m a n  
m o vem en t.  It is c lear  that our set-up corresponds p erfect ly  to 
the sense that m a y  be inferred from  the a b o v e -m e n tio n e d  situ­
ations. O n  the other hand, it appears  that the 4 subjects  w h o  
exp erien ced  som e d iff icu lt ies  in reporting w h a t  they  saw , due 
to the increase of speed after  b ra k in g  (Exp. IV), g a v e  a s o m e ­
w h a t  d ifferent  m e a n in g  to the w o rd  «braking» by tak in g  only  
the inertia  into account.
But one point ought still to be sp e c ia l ly  stressed, n a m e ly  the 
fact that if a ch a n g e  in the system  of st im uli  had an in f lu e n ce  
on the fr e q u e n c y  o f  the causal  responses, it had none on their 
k in d  or their nature.  T h e y  re m a in e d  all the w a y  through  e x a m ­
ples of: «It is as if», g e n e r a l ly  fo l lo w e d  by  a hypothesis  about 
som e p h ysica l  features  l iab le  to ch e ck  the motion.
N o w  this is som eth in g  entire ly  d ifferent from  w h a t  happens
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in the exp erim en ts  on «pushing» and the like, for in the latter 
cases, grad u al  ch an ges  in the system  of st im uli  bring about 
grad u al  ch an ges  in the kind of descriptions g iven  by the ob ser­
vers. This  show s, as M i c h o t t e  has repeatedly  pointed out, a 
direct d ep en d en ce  of the responses upon the stim ulus  pattern. 
In our experim ents,  on the contrary, the description rem ained  
p ract ica l ly  the sa m e  in spite of great d if ferences  in the displays. 
This is a fact w h ic h  supports v ery  strongly  the con clu sio n  d ra w n  
from  the d if ferences  in the content of the verbal  responses in 
the tw o  cases.
A n o th e r  e x p e r im e n t  substantiates the sam e statement. W e  
w a n te d  to k n o w  w h e t h e r  the second object  should  be present 
in the field before  it is reach ed  by the m o v in g  one. This  w o u ld  
seem  probable,  if a n y  causal  response w e r e  to be expected.
Experiment VI.
In the slit (170X 5 mm) is a red rectangle (5 X 10 mm) at 5 mm 
distance from the left side. The background is entirely white. At a 
certain moment the red starts moving to the right (12 cm/sec.). When 
it has moved 60 mm, the black object suddenly appears in such a 
way that its left border coincides with the right side of the red 
object. At the same time the latter changes speed to 1.8 cm/sec.; it 
moves at this speed over the black part and at the moment it has 
altogether left it, the latter disappears again and the red object 
resumes its initial speed of 12 cm/sec., moving on until it disap­
pears behind the screen.
This  e x p e r im e n t  is thus s im ila r  to Exp. IV, the only  d if feren ce  
being  that the second object  appears  su d d en ly  at the m o m e n t  
of the s lo w in g  d o w n  of the m o v e m e n t  and disappears w h e n  it 
resum es its fo rm e r  speed.
U sin g  the ve locit ies  of  Exp. IV  this st im ulus  co n fig u rat io n  a p ­
peared to be co n fu s in g ;  too m a n y  things h ap p en ed  together. 
T h e re fo re  w e  used s lo w e r  speeds, m a in te n in g  their ratio. O n ly  
12 observers  took part in this experim ent,  but 7 of  them  (58 °/o) 
said that the red object  w a s  b e in g  braked  at the ap p earen ce  of 
the black. T h e  d if feren ce  in results w ith  Exp. I is s ignif icant 
(Fisher exact  p rob ab il ity  test: p < .  003).
H o w e v e r ,  it once again  appeared  that 6 out of the 7 causal
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responses w e re  of the «as if» type. T h e  d isp lay  m a d e  the o b ser­
vers recall  b rak in g  situations. O n e  of our subjects  e v e n  said that 
it w a s  not the b la ck  object that braked the red one, but s o m e th ­
ing else not visible, hidden behind the screen. This  is therefore 
another  case in w h ic h  a co n sid era b le  ch a n g e  in the d isp lay  did 
not affect the results accordingly ,  these b e in g  s im ilar  to those 
of Exp. IV. F inally ,  in order to v e r i fy  our m a in  conclusion  that 
the c a u s a l  responses g ive n  by our observers  w e r e  not descrip­
tions of w h a t  they a ctu a l ly  saw , but w e r e  essen tia l ly  hypotheses  
based on acquired  k n o w le d g e  and fram ed in order to ex p la in  
the p erce ived  changes,  w e  carried out a last experim ent,  in 
w h ic h  the speed ratio w a s  inverted;  this resulted in a situation 
p ra ct ica l ly  n e v e r  met in o rd in ary  life.
Experiment VII.
The set-up is similar to that of Exp. IV, but the red rectangle moves 
to the right at the speed of 4.7 cm/sec. until its left side coincides 
with the black’s left side. Its speed increases then suddenly to 31.3 
cm/sec. to resume its former value when its left side coincides with 
the black’s right. Thus we have the three steps: slow-rapid-slow.
This e x p e r im e n t  is the «reverse» of Exp. IV. W h e r e a s  in the 
latter the object decelerated  w h i le  passing in front of the black, 
in Exp. VII it accelerates,  the ratio b e tw e e n  the tw o velocit ies  
being the same.
In the a b o v e  situation, the co n n ect in g  factors of s t im u ltan eity  
and eq u a li ty  of d u ration  and trajectory  of the tw o  ch an ges  (ac­
ce leration  and passing) are thus also at w ork ,  but on the other 
hand, the situation sh o w s  little co n fo rm ity  w ith  e v e r y d a y  events 
and c o m m o n  p h y s ic a l  k n o w le d g e  could  h a rd ly  be applied  to it. 
A m o n g  the 20 subjects  taking part in the exp erim en t,  o n ly  3 re­
ported a causal  con n ection  (15% ) b e tw e e n  passing over  the b lack  
and acceleration, and their reports w e r e  rather poor. O n e  s u b ­
ject said that the b lack  w a s  protruding so that «the red tum bles 
from the black»; a second said that the red w a s  b e in g  pushed 
by the b lack  and the third one that «the red ju m p e d  over  the 
b la c k  b ecau se  it perceived  the b lack  as an obstacle».
T h e  d if feren ce  w ith  the results of Exp. IV is striking (signi­
ficant at the .02 level,  Fisher test). A lth o u g h  the structural fa c ­
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tors w h i c h  tend to bind strongly  together the ch a n g e  in speed 
and the passing  of an object over  another are the same, the 
n u m b e r  of the «causal responses» drops at once accordin g  to 
prediction, and this is quite natural since current life does not 
provide  us w ith  rea d y-m a d e  causal  concepts fitting to such 
cases.
It is also interesting to co m p a re  this ex p er im e n t  w ith  those 
of M i c h o t t e  on the «release effect», w h ic h  takes place  w h e n  
an object  starts m o v in g  after an impact, but at a greater  speed 
than the object w h ic h  hits it (1, p. 116). T h e  reports of the ob ser­
vers are very  d ifferent in this case fro m  those obtained in the 
exp erim en ts  on «pushing» and the like. T h ere  is no question of 
a shock «producing» the m o v e m e n t  of the second object  any 
more, this m o v e m e n t  b e in g  reported as a u to n o m o u s  and just 
«released» at the m o m e n t  of the im pact;  the observers  exp lic it ly  
stress the fact that they h a v e  an impression of direct «depen­
dence» of the m o v e m e n t  upon the im pact  —  a crude unspecif ied  
type of causation. T h e y  also try to find out som e possible e x ­
planations  of the fact in the sam e w a y  as in our experim ents.  
W h e th e r  or not our subjects also had an im pression of such an 
indefinite  «dependence» of the ch an g e  of speed on the passing 
over  the second object, w e  h a v e  no reason to b e l ieve  because  
they d o n ’t m e n tio n  it. and this assum ption  is by no m ean s  re­
quired in order to understand our results.
G E N E R A L  C O N C L U S I O N
C o n sid e r in g  all these data, it seem s that the most interesting 
result of our investigations lies in the e x p e r im e n ta l  ev id en ce  
that an o b je c t iv e  criterion  m a y  h elp  to establish and ju st ify  the 
distinction b e tw e e n  tw o classes of causal  verb al  responses 
elicited by v isua l  situations:
1" V erb a l  responses corresponding to genuine,  specific  causal  
visual  impressions.
2° Cases in w h ic h  the causal  bond is not a c tu a l ly  perceived, 
but inferred from  perceptual  data of another  kind (2, p. 
389 sq.).
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It has been s h o w n  that 'in these latter cases, the content of 
the verbal statements doe ,^ not v a r y  in nature, in spite of c o n ­
siderable  ch an ges  in the patterns of the display,  these b r in gin g  
about m ere d if ferences  in the freq u en cy  of the causal  responses.
In the first case, on the contrary, as Miciiotte has been able to 
demonstrate it, there is a close parallelism between changes in 
the displays and corresponding in the content of the responses.
Further research w i l l  be needed to f ind out h o w  far this c r i ­
terion m a y  be applied to other cau sa l  situations, but it seems 
that one can reason ably  b e l ieve  in its gen era l  value.
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